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By changing its policy, Brazil could increase its sugar exports
greatly.  The  world price would decline, but Brazil's  sugar
revenues  would  increase.
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Brazil is b-  dC  the largest sugarcane producer, with output of well
over 200 miliion tons of cane annually.  However, only about one-third of the
cane grown is used to produce sugar. The majority is used to produce ethanol--
a  substitute automobile  fuel  Brazil  is the fourth latgest sugar producer
after  the  EEC,  India  and  the  USSR.  The  vast quantities of cane produced
potentially give Brazil an  immense capacity to produce more  sugar.  If all
cane grown were used to produce sugar, Brazilian sugar output would rise from
around 8 million tons annually to over 20 million tons.  Currently, around 105
million tons of sugar are produced worldwide each year.
A  tight net of governmental controls and interventions has long been
a  feature  of  the  Brazilian  industry.  They  strictly limit  the  industry's
ability to switch cane between ethanol and sugar production.  Potentially, the
economic gains for the Brazilian economy from diverting cane away from ethanol
to  sugar are great.  With a border price of petroleum at around $24/barrel
($18/barrel for Saudi crude) the shadow price of ethanol as a fuel substitute,
measured  in  sugar equivalents,  is about  4-5¢/lb only.  Compared to recent
world sugar prices in the range 9-15c/lb, the marginal opportunity cost of not
switching is clear.
Brazil's ethanol program has been strongly promoted by government and
has  been  highly  visible.  Politically, a  radical reversal of  policies on
ethanol seems unlikely.  Nevertheless, the economic arguments for switching at
least some cane away from ethanol  to sugar production are very persuasive.- 2 -
Because Brazil is already a major exporter and given ic has the sugarcane to
nearly treble its sugar output, the impact of a change in Brazilian policies
on the world price is of great interest.  The purpose of this 3tudy was to
estimate the potential impact of changes in Brazilian production on the world
sugar  market.  Policy implications of the impact will also be discussed.
A nine-region trade model of the world sugar economy is used to study
Brazil's impact on the market.  The model is  dynamic, allowing both short- and
long-run impacts to be studied.  The model also makes  it possible to study
Brazil's potential to affect the variability of the world price--sugar is the
most volatile of all commodity markets.-3-
II.  CONSTRAINTS  ON BaAZILIAN SUCAR  PRODUCTION
Unconstrained  market  forces  play  little  if  any  role  in  the  allocation
of resources  in Brazilian  sugarcane,  sugar or ethanol  industries. Through
various interventions  and  controls, the  Brazilian government indirectly
determines  the structure  and behavior  of these  industries.  Annual  production
quotas  allocated  to farms,  mills  and  distilleries  regulate  the  location,  size
and  distribution  of the  sugarcane  crop. Domestic  sugarcane,  sugar  and  ethanol
prices are  fixed and exports are controlled.  Overall, intervention  and
controls isolate producers and  consumers from changes in  world market
conditions. Changes  in world sugar  or fuel prices  therefore  have no direct
effect  on the  production  or consumption  of sugarcane  or its  derivatives.
Sugarcane,  sugar  and ethanol  prices  for producers  are fixed  at high
enough  levels  relative  to costs  to ensure  all  available  production  quotas  are
filled. By world standards,  Brazilian  sugarcane  and sugar  producers  are  very
low  cost.  Ethanol  production  is not zost  competitive  with imported  crude  oil
prices  but ethanol prices  to producers  are set sufficiently  high to ensure
distilleries  face incentives  to fill  their  quotas. Also,  concessional  credit
is provided  for investment  in distilleries. Quotas,  however,  are the main
determinants  of production.  Any switching  which  occurs  between  the  production
of sugar  and  ethanol  occurs  as the  direct  result  of changes  in  quotas  only.
During  the 1980s  quota  increases  for  ethanol  far outpaced  those  for
sugar.  As seen in Figure  1, production  of cane increased  appreciably  while
sugar  production  was held  reasonably  steady--the  increase  in  cane  was  used for-4-
ethanol production  Polici  is favor the consumption  of ethanol over other
fuels  and regular  increases  in supply  have been  necessary  to meet the  energy
demands  of the  ever-enlarging  fleet  of ethanol-powered  cars.
Until recently  the retail  price  of ethanol  was set at a substantial
discount  relative  to the blended  gasoline/ethanol  price,  and many cars are
fully  reliant  on pure  ethanol.  It is very costly  to convert  ethanol-powered
engines  to  gasoline. The  ethanol  fuel  program  has  reduced  Brazil's  dependence
on imported  oil, but has made its economy  highly  dependent  on the use of
sugarcane  for  ethanol  production.  Each  year  the  stock  of cars  running  on pure
ethanol is  increasing.  With  total production controlled by government
policies,  large  volumes  of the  1989/90  cane  crop  have  been  diverted  from  sugar
production  to meet the rising  ethanol  demand.  This  has  occurred  despite  the
higher  sugLr  prices  and  has caused  Brazil's  sugar  exports  to decline  to a 25-
year low--in  fact they  have been  declining  since  1984/85  (see  Figure  2).  The
empirical  evidence  (see Wong, Sturgiss  and Borrell,  1989) is that Brazil's
capacity  to switch  cane between  sugar  and ethanol  in response  to even  larger
changes in crude oil and  sugar prices is greatly limited under current
policies.-5-
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Source: World  Bank,  Brazil  Agriculture  Operations  Division,
Latin  America  and the  Caribbean  Region.-6-
Figure  2: PRODUCTION  CONSUMPTION  AND  EXPORTS
OF  BRAZILIAN  SUGAR
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I1I.  A MODEL  OF THE  BRAZILIAN  SUCARCANE, SUGAR ANI  ETHANOL
INDUSTRY POLICIES
The  workings of  the  various instruments included in  Brazil's
cane/sugar/ethanol  program are  illustrated  in Figure 3.  The demand for
sugarcane  is  a derived  demand  arising  from  the  demand  for  sugar  (domestic  and
international)  and the  demand for ethanol.  The derived  demand  arising  from
Brazilian sugar conFumers is represented  in the left panel of the graph
(dds).  The  demand  for sugarcane  for  the  production  of ethanol  is the  derived
demand after taking into account  all policies  favoring  the consumption  of
ethanol  over other fuels  and is represented  in the  middle  panel (dde'). In
the absence  of such  policies  the derived  demand  for  sugarcane  emanacing  from
ethanol  demand  would be highly  inelastic  over a small  range  and then become
perfectly  elastic  reflecting  the world price  of other fuels.  This is also
represented  in the middle  panel  (dde).  In the  right-hand  panel  the  rest-of-
the-world  demand  and supply  of sugar  are represented  in sugarcane  equivalent
terms.
The  total  supply of  Brazilian sugarcane, if  the  market were
undistorted,  is represented  in the left  :nel (ss).  For the purposes  of
illustration  it is assumed  that the Brazilian  market for sugar  provides  the
primary  demand  for sugarcane  and consumes  ql.  Excess  supplies  of sugar  are
exported  to the rest of the  world.  In sugarcane  equivalent  terms,  q2-ql  is
depicted  as being  exported  from  the  left  panel  and imported  in  the  right-hand
panel, and  the world market is in equilibrium  at the world price (WP--
expressed in sugarcane  equivalent  terms).  Excess supplies  are also made
available  to the ethanol  industry  and market,  as shown  in the middle  panel.
(q3-q2)  of sugarcane  is  transferred  to  the  ethanol  market  for  sugarcane.FIGURE  3:  REPRESENTATION  OF  BRAZILIAN  POLICIES
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The  supply  of sugarcane  to sugar mills is limited by production
quotas  on sugar and delivery  quotas  on sugarcane  itself--equivalent  to q2.
Once the quotas  to the sugar  mills  are filled,  excess  supplies  of cane are
used to fill the delivery  quotas  to ethanol  distilleries  and .he  production
quotas  placed on distilleries  themselves  (q3-q2).  Irrespective  of whether
cane is delivered  to distilleries  or mills,  growers  receive  the government-
fixed  cane  price (BP).  As depicted,  the  cane  price  is set  sufficiently  high
to ensure  all quotas  (in  total  the sugarcane  quota  is q3)  are filled. It is
assumed  that prices  for sugar  and ethanol  to consumers  are set in a manner
that enabl.!s  the dcmestic  markets  to clear.  In reality,  prices  and quota
levels  are  not always  consistent  with the  market  clearing  at government-fixed
prices. This opens  the opportunity  for  black  mar  eteering. For the  sake  of
analysis  it is also assumed  that domestic  sugar  prices  are set in line  with
world  prices,  though  in fact the world price  fluctuates  widely  and domestic
price.  are  fixed,  being  sometimes  above  and  sometimes  below  the  world  price.
The economic  effects  of the  policies  can  be illustrated  by comparing
the present situation  to that which would prevail  under competitive  free
trade.  This is  also  tepresented  in  Figure  3.  The  fixed  cane  price,  production
and  delivery  quotas,  and  policies  favoring  ethanol  consumption  would  no longer
apply. Demand  for  ethanol  would  change  in line  with that  represented  Uy curve
dde instead  of dde'.  Unless  there  was  a substantial  change  in relative  world
sugar/fuel  prices  (compared  to the  current  situation  in the  world  markets  for
these commodities),  the change in demand for cane from the ethanol  sector
would lead  to  a significant  quantity  of sugarcane  being  diverted  from  ethanol
to sugar  production  in the  long  term [(q3-q2)-(q3'-q2')].  In the  short  term,10  -
ethanol may not be represented by the opportunity cost of alternative fuels
because the cost of converting ethanol-powered engines to alternative fuels is
high.  Nonetheless, in th  long term, greater quantities of  sugar would  be
produced for the world market (not only because of switching from ethanol to
sugar but also because (q2'-q3')  extra sugar would be produced as a result of
dropping the production controls) causing the world price to decline from WP
to WP*; (q2'-ql') would be exported to the world market.  The extent of the
world  price  decline would  principally depend  on  the nature  of  supply and
demand in all other trading countries (that is, by the slopes of the demand
and supply curves in the right-hand panel).
If Brazil's  impact on the world sugar market is not  large and  the
world price does not decline below BP, the production and income of Brazilian
sugarcane  growers could increase in a free trade situation.  This situation is
depicted  in  Figure  3.  Growers'  welfare  would  increase  by  c+d+e+f+g+h.
Economic rents  represented by  a+c,  which  are  currently  being  received  by
either the government or others in the marketing chain, would be  lost.  As
indicated, growers would receive c.  Consumers would receive a.  Consumers
would also gain b.  Fuel users would gain  i+j+k+n+o+p, while others in the
ethanol marketing chain currently gaining rents equal to i+j+l+m would lose
them.  However, the government would save on s'lbsidies  currently being paid to
ethanol  producers  (not  shown  in  the  graph).  Overall,  the gains  to  the
Brazilian economy  would be at least b+d+e+f+g+h+k+o+p.
If Brazil's impact on the world sugar market is large and the world
price declines significantly below BP, it is conceivable that the production- 11  -
and  income of  Brazilian  sugarcane growers  could decline  in  a  free  trade
situation.  Nonetheless, the Brazilian economy is still likely to benefit due
to the reduction in fuel costs.  Ultimately, the benefits of switching cane
from ethanol to sugar production  depend on Brazil's impact  on the world price.
This, in turn, depends on the elasticity of demand for Brazilian sugar.- 12  -
IV.  BRAZIL'S IMPACT  ON THE WORLD SUGAR PRICE
Government intervention in domestic sugar markets is widespread and
typically insulates producers and consumers from changes in the world price.
World  production and consumption are,  therefore, relatively unresponsive to
changes in the world price, at least in the short term.  Only stock demand is
relatively responsive to changes in the world price, and then only at certain
times (as discussed below).
Because  consumption  and  production  are  largely  unresponsive  to
changes in the world price, increases in Brazil's production may need to be
matched (mostly)  by increased quantities of stocks demanded in other countries
in the  short run.  The  world  price will adjust to  induce stockholders to
willingly  hold  such  stocks.  Changes  in  stock demand  may,  therefore,  be
important in understanding the price effects of increases in Brazilian supply.
When stock levels are high, security of supply is well established
and the value of stocks is low.  Accordingly, the world price is low.  A small
change  in  stock  levels  either  way  will  not  change  the  implied  level  of
security much.  So, any additional supply from Brazil could be held as stocks
without much change in the value of total stocks, implying little change in
the world price.  If, however, stock levels are very low then the existing
stocks have very high value (world price is high).  A small change in supplies
at this time will have a relatively large impact on security.  An increase in
supplies from Brazil would quickly increase security and therefore the world
price might fall rapidly.  In the short run, therefore,  Brazil's influence  on- 13  -
the world price could be greater when the world price is high compared to when
it is low because of the response of stocks demand.
Although slowly,  policy makers do respond to changes  in the world
sugar  price, causing  some  response in  production and  consumption  over  the
longer term.  The world sugar price is  notoriously volatile and cyclical.  And
at times, changes in policy can be large.  Therefore, over the longer term,
other  countries  may  make  adjustments  to  help  accommodate  the  increased
production from Brazil, thus lessening Brazil's impact.
Volatility  in  world agricultural commodity markets generally  gives
rise to forces which compel farmers to form coalitions and to demand political
action  to address  farm problems caused by price instability and risk.  The
incentives for consumer groups (and perhaps taxpayers) to respond politically
to volatile  prices are  different from  those of  farmers.  Uneven  political
pressures  from  producers, consumers  and  taxpayers are  postulated by  Wong,
Sturgiss  and  Borrell  (1989)  to  give  rise  to  policy  intervention  which
consistently favors one group over another in domestic sugar  markets.  Usually
this involves protection to farmer groups.  Policy responses to changes in the
world price are therefore postulated to be asymmetric.  Production quotas and
producer (and consumer) prices are usually increased one or two years after a
world price rise or peak, but are decreased only slowly in response to price
falls.
In the past, long periods of surplus production have followed price
booms.  When prices fall due to a surge in production, producers have a strong14 -
incentive to see their fixed investments protected.  Given that governments
may have, or appeared to have, encouraged their industries to expand  in the
first  place,  politically  it  is difficult  to  lower  protection--despite the
rising  economic  and  financial  costs  of  such  policies.  The  continuing
protection  of  the  enlarged  industries causes  another  sustained  period  of
depressed prices.  Indeed, the expectation of increased protection resulting
from low prices may be an incentive for producers to overexpand when given the
opportunity to do so due to a policy change.
Only after long periods of depressed prices is action likely to be
taken to decrease  levels of government support.  With low world  prices the
costs  of  export rebates and  government  stockholding increase considerably.
Further, the costs to consumers increase,  Eventually, these mounting costs
lead to changes in the domestic price level or to changes in other instruments
such as production controls, but  these changes occur slowly and only after
sustained periods of low prices.
In the long term, the asymmetry of policy and production to changes
in  the world  price  in many  countries may  hold  important implications for
Brazil.  Contrary to the short-run impact, Brazilian expansion will have less
effect on the long-run average world price if it occurs when the world price
is rising than if it is falling.  Such results  have been obtained in analyzing
Australia's  long-term  impact  on  the  world  market  (Sturgiss, Connell  and
Tobler,  1990).  Expansions which ease supply shortfalls duting a period of
rising prices will  reduce the extent of the peak in the price cycle.  The
incentives  for  policy  changes  in  other  countries,  particularly high-cost- 15  -
countries  which  otherwise  encourage  large  expansions,  will  be  lessened.
Taking account of  the phase of the world price cycle when expansion begins
may, therefore, be important to understanding Brazil's potential to affect the
world market.
Changes in the world market could alter Brazil's future impact on the
world price.  There could be changes in the responsiveness of world demand and
supply  to  movements  in the  world  price.  A  move  towards  less  regulation
through the current GATT round of multilateral traae negotiations would expose
more  producers  and consumers  to  the world  price.  The  emergence of  close
substitutes for sugar, such as aspartame or crystalline high fructose would
also make consumers somewhat more responsive to changes in the sugar price.
Such  increased  responsiveness  of  producers  and  consumers  would  make  the
effects of a Brazilian expansion on the world price less than might currently
be the case.- 16  -
V.  EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF BRAZIL'S INFLUENCE  ON THE  WORLD PRICE
The  world  sugar market  model  of  Wong,  et  al  (1989)  was  used  to
estimate Brazil's  potential  impact on  the  world  market  price.  Sustained
increases in Brazilian sugar production of O.S million  tons, 2 million tons
and 6 million  tons were simulated and compared with a baseline run in which
producLion was assumed to increase in a fashion similar to what has occurred
in the past.  To examine the sensitivity of Brazil's influence on price at
different phases of the world price cycle, sustained increases were simulated
from two different start dates.
Although  sustained  output  increases  provide  a  basis  on  which  to
estimate  Brazil's  influence on  the  market,  in  reality  if  producers  were
exposed  to  world  prices  they  would  have  incentives  to  respond  to  and
anticipate price changes.  Accordingly, production would vary to some extent
with fluctuations in the world price.  The potential for Brazilian producers
to respond to the world price in an unregulated environment cannot be easily
determined.  However, to provide some representation of the potential effects
of producer flexibility, a procedure similar to that used by Wong, et al was
used. I/
1/  The procedure used in this study varies from that used by Wong et al in
the way the price expectation variable is specified.  In Wong et al the
deterministic world price is used as the expected price, and the assumed
forecasting  error  is  the  difference  between  the  deterministic  and
stochastic world price.  The forecasting error is therefore explained by
random  shocks  which  producers  cannot  anticipate.  This  technique  is
computationally complex because both deterministic and stochastic versions
of the model must be solved simultaneously.  The computer time taken to
run the model more than doubles compared to when just one version of theFor each simulation, the model was run 60 times over the period 1985
to 2004 with different shocks representing random elements affecting produc-
tion (such as weather) being applied in each year and in each simulation.  The
results presented are the averages of the 60 simulations for each year.  They
therefore represent the average impact under a wide range of potential market
conditions.  Accordingly, the results should be regarded as  illustrative of
the potential impact under a variety of market conditions rather than forecast
effects based  on  current market  conditions.  The  forward  simulations  are
performed  based on market information  up until 1985. The simulations therefore
do not take into account the recent, and most unexpected, decline in Brazilian
exports.  The prices presented for the baseline simulation are not World Bank
forecasts.  They do, however, represent the type of price behavior that can
generally be expected in the world market--although to some extent the true
variability of price is masked by the averaging of the 60 simulations.
The  estimated  effects  of  sustained  increases  in  production  and
exports from 1985 onwards are presented in Table 1.  Over the entire 20-year
period  simulated,  the  0.5  million  ton  increase  in  Brazilian  production
translates into  an average 8.3% increase in exports.  Because the increase is
model is run.  To overcome this difficulty a simpler procedure was used
which achieves a similar result.  The expected world price was set equal
to the stochastic (or actual model-generated) world price plus a  random
error with a mean of zero and a standard  deviation equal to that generated
for each year from all 60 stochastic runs for the baseline.  The assumed
producer forecasting error  was  therefore  assumed  to  be  random with  a
distribution  reflecting  the  expected  distribution  of  prices  in  any
particular year, given the typical sorts of random shocks in production
and their effect on the uncertainty of prices.  The standard forecasting
error is over 40% of the long-run average world price, and is therefore
quite large.TabWe  I Effects  on  World Price  of Sustained  Expansions  from 1985 Onwards
Year  Simulated  -------------------  Cange in World Pr  e  --
World Price  8.3%  increase  in exports  *  32.6% increase  ip exports*  96.1  % increase  'n exports *
USc/lb  %  Elasticity of  %  Elasticity of  %  Elasticilty  of
Export  Demand  Export  Demand  Exp)ort  Demano
1  985  7.3  -4.4  -3.1  - 16.4  -3.3  -40.2  -4 0
1  986  6.1  -5.7  -2.5  -20.6  -2.7  -47.9  -3 3
1  987  8.3  -6.2  - ?.7  -22.6  -1.8  -52.7  -2 2
1  988  9.0  -5.5  - 1.8  -21 .1  -1.9  -52  0  -2 2
1989  1  4.5  -5.5  - 1.6  -20.7  - 1.7  -54 0  -1.8
1  990  1  4.1  -3.5  -2.7  - 16.3  -2.3  -48 2  -2 3
1  99 1  1  1 8  -2.5  -3.7  - 12.7  -3.0  -42.3  -2  6
1  992  1  5.2  -2.6  -3. 1  - 1  1.2  -2.9  -38  2  -2  5
1993  26.6  -2.6  -3.0  -10.4  -3.3  -36 0  -2  5
1  994  22.4  - 1.8  -4.6  -6.7  -4.9  -24  6  -4  0
1  995  1  3.7  -0.7  -1 1.6  -2.2  -1i1.2  - 10 8  -9 0
1996  11.9  -0.8  -9.4  -4.2  -7.1  -13.7  -65
1997  13 0  - 1.5  -4.9  -7.7  -3.8  -23  1  -3.8
1  998  1  4.0  -2.1  -3.7  -9.3  -3.3  -26.4  -3  5
1999  13 6  -2.2  -3.4  -8.8  -3.4  -27.0  -3  3
2000  12.9  -2.3  -3.3  -9.0  -3.4  -26 0  -3  4
2001  18.6  -2.1  -3.1  -8.1  -3.2  -25.8  -3 0
2002  20.6  -1.4  -4.9  -6.3  -4.4  -22 8  -3 6
2003  1  7.3  - 1.7  -4.0  -4.6  -6.0  -1 6 8  - 4 9
2004  15.4  -0.6  - 10.7  -3.2  -8.2  - 1  3.6  -58
Avereae  14.3  -2.4  -3.5  -9.8  -3.3  -30  1  -3 ?
>: Baseline  average  of 60 stochastic  simulations  in 1984  dollar  terms.
Average  increase  across  all  simulations  and  all  years.19  _
constant  over  the  period,  it  is a  declining  percentage  of  total  exports
through time--exports are simulated to grow through time irrespective of the
exogenous increase.  Similarly, the 2 rillion ton and 6 million ton increases
translate into 32.6% and 96.1% average increases in Brazilian exports.
Based on the sin,  lation results, the elasticity of Brazilian exporL
demand over  the projections  period  is estimated at between -_.5  and  -3.2,
implying that each  1%  increase in Brazilian exports would  lower  the world
price  by  between  0.29%  and  0.31%  (i.e., the  reciprocals of  the  estimated
elasticities) on average over a long period. 2/  Brazil is therefore estimated
to indeed be influential in affecting the world price, but its influence is
estimated to be insufficient to mean that Brazil could increase total revenue
by restricting production.  For this to occur, the elasticity would have to be
greater than or equal to -1.0.
The impacts of .ie sustained increases on the world price are seen to
vary through time about a declining trend.  In part, the declining trend is
explained  by  the  growth  in  world  consumption  through  time.  It  is also
explained  by  the  adjustments  which  Brazil's  expansion  induces  in  other
countries.  The greatest impact occurs 3 to 5 years after the expansion.  The
delayed impact  occurs because the simulated increase  begins in a period of low
world prices when stocks are already at a high level.  As explained earlier,
when stocks are high  small changes in them do  not much  affect the implied
security of supply and so prices change less than when stock levels are low.
Nonetheless, because production and consumption worldwide are so unresponsive
2!  The  ransformation from price elasticities to price  impact can  be made
under certain conditions--see, for  examp'  ,  Houck  (1965).- 20 -
to changes in the world price in the short term, increased exports by Brazil
during a  period of  low prices cause an  increase in world stocks generally.
This  prolongs  the  period  of  depressed  prices,  having  a  relatively  large
negative ettect during a period when prices first start to increase.
Brazil's increases have their least effect on the world price in the
period  immediately  following  a  boom.  This  is  due  to  two  behavioral
characteristics incorporated in  the model.  First,  is the fact that  lower
prices during  a  boom  period reduce  the incentives for changes  in policies
which,  in  the  past, have  led to  large increases  in production  worldwide.
Reduced production elsewhere in the world mitigates the effects of Brazil's
expansion.  Second, is the effect on stocks referred to above.
The fact that Brazil's influence on the world price is lower during
periods of high prices and immediately after them raises questions about the
timing of expansions.  In Figure 4, the impact on the world price of sustained
0.5 million ton increases starting in 1985 or 1992 (the beginning of a boom
period)  are compared.  The initial impact is less for the 1992 start date than
for the 1985 start date.  Moreo:er, although beginning the output increase in
the run-up to a boom is more  influential in reducing very high prices than
during a depressed phase, virtually throughout the remainder of the period the
impact on  price from  the 1992 start date  is less.  Indeed, in the period
following the boom, prices in this simulation actually increase due to the
fact that other  countries are not  encouraged to expand as  dramatically in
response to the boom as they do in the other simulation.  The elasticity of
export demand  in the  1992-start simulation is estimated at 4.4 over the 13
years to 2004, implying that a 1% increase in exports would lower the world
price by 0.23%, compared to around 0.3% when the increase starts in 1985.- 21  -
Figure  4:  Comparison of effect on prie  of 5uswired mwmases  m 1985 vs 1992
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As  sLated  e  ar  ier,  sustained  Bra7i  I  iat  iut  put  increases  may  niot be
realistic if producers are  free to respond to the variability  in the world
price.  As well as increasing production and exports to a greater extent when
prices are  high, producers would  tend to  reduce production as  prices fall.
Thus, world prices would be less variable ir.  this more realistic world.
Without  a  detailed analysis,  it  is not  possible  to determine  the
flexibility of producers to respond to the world price.  However, to provide
some representation of the potential effects, it was assumed producers could
respond directly to expected world prices to produce an additional quantity of
sugar.  It was assumed that when expected world prices rose above USC10/lb,
producers would progressively increase production up to a maximum additional
quantity of  2.5% of world production at an expected price of US'25/lb.  The
flexible component of production was added to the non-;lexible component.
For  illustrative purposes, three  forms of  price expectations were
assumed--model-consistent  expectations,  perfect  fo.-sight,  and  naive
expectations.  Under model-consistent expectations, producers are assumed to
have knowledge of all the information embodied in the model and to form their
expectations of  price  in  the  same fashion as  the model  solves for  price.
However,  because  of  random  factors  producers  will  make  price  forecasting
errors.  Their forecasting errors are assumed to be normally distributed with
a mean of zero and a standard deviation equal  to the standard deviation of
prices for each year generated by the 60 stochastic runs of the model--which
ranges from USC2.7/lb to USc8.5/lb (also see footnote 1).The other forms of expectations were chosen as extreme alternatives.
Under perfect foresight, producers are assumed to make no forecasting error,
while under  naive  expectations  producers  are  assumed  to  expect  that  next
year's price will not be different from the current price.  Perfect foresight
provides an upper bound on the possible effects of expectations on production
flexibility,  while the naive expectations assumption provides a lower bound.
The  potential  price  impacts  of  allowing  producer  flexibility  in
supply are presented in Table 2.  The results under the assumption of perfect
foresight suggest that if producers are able  to anticipate  prices exactly,
increasing  production and exports to a certain extent can raise prices in some
instances (1995-2000  in  Table 2) and cause the long-term impact  on  price
(-0.07% for each  1% increase in exports) to be considerably less than when
one-off, sustained increases are  introduced.  Even allowing for quite large
forecast errors  (equal to  more  than 40%  of  the average  world  price  under
model-consistent  expectations),  similar,  though  slightly  less  pronounced,
impacts  are simulated.  The counter cyclical nature of producers' response to
the world price under model-consistent expectations tends to make price less
variable, as  seen by substantial reductions in the coefficient of  variation
(0.46  to 0.392).  Even under naive expectations there is some reduction in the
coefficient of  variation.  Under  naive  expectations  the average  negative
impact on the world price is, however, similar to that observed when sustained
increases  are simulated (-0.36).  The world price impacts of flexible produc-
tion under the assumptions about price expectations are shown in  Figure 5.- 24 -
Tdble  2:  Impdct  on Worild t'rice  vi1li  :vexAle Production  (1984  USf/Iu)
Model  odel
Model  Consistent  Consistent
Naive  Consistent  Pertect  7.5-25  USf/Ib  7.5-25  USt/lb
Yedr  BaselIne  Fxpectat  cii,  Expectations  Foresight  2.5% Limit  5.0%  Limit
1985  7.3  7,3  (0.0)  7.2  (-0.09)  7.3  (-0.03)  7.2  (-0.13)  7.1  (-0.23)
1986  6.1  6.1  (-0.02)  6.0  (-0.04)  6.1  (0.0)  6.0  (-0.09)  5.9 (-0.16)
1987  8.3  8.3  (-0.02)  8.1  (-0.15)  8.2  (-0.08)  8.0  (-0.25)  7.8  (-0,44)
1988  9.0  8.9  (-0.09)  8.7  (-0.21)  8.8  (-0.1)  8.6  (-0.36)  8.3  (-0,62)
1989  14.5  14.3  (-0.18)  13.4  (-1.09)  i3.5  (-1.01)  13.2  (-1.31)  12.3  (-2,17)
1990  14.1  13,. (-1.13)  13.0  (-1.13)  13.1  (-1.0)  12.8  (-1,34)  11.9  (-2,22)
1991  11.8  11.0 (-0.77)  11.5  (-0.36)  11.5  (-0.28)  11.3  (-0.54)  10.8  (-1.01)
1992  15.2  14.6  (-0.55)  14.6  (-0.59)  14.6  (-0.61)  14.4  (-0.76)  13.7  (-1.49)
199w  26.6  24.8  (-1.72)  23.1  (-3.5)  22.8  (-3.79)  23.0  (-3.53)  20.1  (-6.5)
1994  22.4  18.6  (-3.72)  20.2  (-2.11)  20.2  (-2.2)  20.2  (-2.15)  18,2  (-4.12)
1995  13.7  12.4  (-1.33)  14.6  (0.94)  14.9  (1.22)  14.4  (0.74)  14.4  (0,73)
1996  11.9  12.3  (0.39)  13.5  (1.58)  13.6  (1.69)  13.3  (1.34)  13.7  (1.78)
1997  13.0  13.8  (0.75)  14.3  (1.27)  14.4  (1.33)  14.0  (0.98)  14,1 (1.06)
1998  14.0  14.1  (0.08)  14.5  (0.49)  14,7  (0.66)  14.3  (0.24)  13,9  (-0.15)
1999  13.6  13.0  (-0.06)  13,8  (0.21)  14,1  (0.5)  13.5  (-0.03)  13,1 (-0,49)
2000  12.9  12.3  (-0.54)  13.2  (0.36)  13.5  (0.64)  13.0  (0.14)  12.7  (-0.18)
2001  18.6  18.3  (-0.34)  18.4  (-0.22)  18.5  (-o.1)  18.2  (-0.44)  17.0  (-1.56)
2002  20.6  18.8  (-1.86)  19.7  (-0.96)  19.6  (-1.07)  19.5  (-1,13)  18.0  (-2.67)
2003  17.3  15.2  (-2.06)  17.0  (-0.29)  17.2  (-0.0?)  16.8  (-0.44)  15.9  (-1.33)
2004  15.4  14.6  (-0.85)  15.8  (0.38)  16.3  (0.86)  15.6  (0.16)  15.2  (-0.27)
Average  14.3  13.6  (-0.7)  14.0  (-0.3)  14.1  (-0.2)  13.9  (-0.4)  13.2  (-1.1)
Coeff. Var  0.466  0,429  0.392  0.382  0.397  0.357
Average I  impact  Per 1  -0.30  -0.11  -0,07  -0.16  -0.21
Increade  in txports
Average %  Increase in  14.1  17.1  16.5  19.9  36.2
Exports
Average  E lasticity  ot  -2.77  -8.82  -14.15  -6.35  -4.72
xport  Dcmand
Note.  (  i  iS  ch3'qe  - _5¢'11  (1984  uii  ars,  comnodred  to  the baseline.
Source:  ori  d  i  .,  L.  !  i  ;  .
Octctier  10,  1990L 
Figure S:  Impact on World Plrice  with Flexible P'roduction
under Alternative Assumpticns about Price Expectations
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The  average  negative  impact  is  also  sensitive  to  the  amount  of
flexible  production  assumed  and  to  the  price  range  over  which  flexible
production is assumed to take place.  In Table 2 and Figure 6 the effects of
changing both the amount and the range are demonstrated.  When the range is
changed from 10-15C/lb to 7.5-25c/lb (7.5C/lb is more in line with the sugar
price at which sugar starts to become clearly more profitable than ethanol),
the elasticity of export demand under model-consistent expectations changes
from -8.82 to -6.35--and the increase in exports over the baseline run changes
from  +17.1%  to  +19.9%.  When  the  maximum  allowable  amount  of  flexible
production  is doubled from 2.5% of world  production to  5% (over  the price
range 7.5-25C/lb), the estimated elasticity changes from -6.35 to -4.72.  The
increase in exports over the baseline changes from +19.9% to +36.2%.  Compared
to the baseline, the coefficient of variation in world prices is reduced by
about 22%.Figure  6:  Impact  on  World  Price  With  Flexible  Production  Under  Model  Consistent  Expectations  and
Alternative  Assumptions  About  the  Range  and  Extent  of Producer  Responsiveness
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS
Although  facing  political  difficulties  ii, attempting  to  switch
sugarcane away from the production of ethanol to sugar production and exports,
Brazil potentially could achieve large economic gains from doing so.  However,
because of the vast quantities of sugarcane which could be switched to sugar
production, the impact this might have on the world price for sugar could have
a  bearing  on  the  economics  of  reforming  the  sugarcane, ethanol  and  sugar
industries in Brazil.
Results  presented  in  this  paper  suggest  that  changes  in Brazil's
sugar production have a reasonably large impact on world sugar prices in the
short term.  Nonetheless, its influence is not estimated to be great enough,
either  in the short term or  long term, to enable Brazil to increase total
revenue by restricting production (through the continued use of quotas).  From
the results  it appears  that  the  long-term  impact that  Brazilian expansion
would have on the world price is sensitive to the types of policies Brazil
adopts.  Expansions of exports occurring as the result of sustained increases
in quotas would have a larger relative negative impact on the world price than
if the same long-term percentage increase were achieved by leaving producers
free  to  respond  to  world  prices  (i.e.,  they  adjust  their  production and
exports in response to expected prices).
There  are  general  reasons  for  believing  that  Brazil's  long-term
impact on  price  could  be  even  less  than  estimated  here.  Orcutt  (1950)
discusses a number of reasons why econometric estimates of price elasticities- 29 -
in incernational trade may be underestimated, which implies that a country's
potential  impact  on  world  prices  from  changes  in  supply  would  be
overestimated.  Some of Orcutt's  reasons may  be valid with  respect to the
estimates in this paper.  Further, as reviewed earlier, if structural changes
in the world market make the rest of the world's producers and consumers more
responsive to  the world price  in the future, Brazil's  impact on  the world
price from changes in its exports will tend to be less than estimated.
Based on these findings it seems reasonable to conclude that although
Brazil appears to have the pote tial to influence world sugar prices to some
degree in the short term, it is nonetheless unable to influence them t'..  its
short- or  long-term  advantage  by  restricting  production.  Indeed,  to  the
extent that the results presented suggest the possibility that Brazil could
introduce an element of stability to world prices by allowing its producers
increased flexibility  in production,  removing  existing  production  controls
could  provide  not  only  substantial  economic  gains  in  terms  of  increased
exports to Brazil but also more stable world prices.  For other producers,
there could be a trade-off in terms of lower but more stable incomes.- 30 -
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